Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-08-19 18:39:55 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-08-29 09:07:59 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 9 days, 14 hours, 28 minutes |
| 2025-09-05 10:47:37 UTC | Report generation time | 16 days, 16 hours, 7 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 67. Missed: 6. Coverage: 91.8%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +66 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 66 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- CMC
- MaxSecure
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- ViRobot
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Extensive network activity (46.38% of behavior) points to data exfiltration, command-and-control communications, or lateral movement capabilities. This threat is designed for persistent communication with external infrastructure.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
| Category | Weight | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Network | 192 | 46.38% |
| System | 181 | 43.72% |
| File System | 18 | 4.35% |
| Registry | 14 | 3.38% |
| Process | 8 | 1.93% |
| Synchronization | 1 | 0.24% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1027.002 – packed with Mpress
- T1129 – Drops a binary and executes it
- T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
- T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
- T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
- T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
- T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
- T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
- T1071 – Performs HTTP requests potentially not found in PCAP.
- T1071 – Creates a slightly modified copy of itself
- T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
- T1027 – Executable file is packed/obfuscated with MPRESS
- T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
- T1027.002 – Executable file is packed/obfuscated with MPRESS
- T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.27 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
| www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type |
|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | A |
| 5isohu.com | A |
| www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 5 | udp |
| 53 | 10 | udp |
| 3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.11 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.2361998558044434 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 49563 | 5355 | 3.1716160774230957 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 54650 | 5355 | 3.172008991241455 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 55601 | 5355 | 3.599181890487671 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 60205 | 5355 | 3.176387071609497 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 62798 | 5355 | 5.798476934432983 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 239.255.255.250 | 62184 | 3702 | 3.1777470111846924 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51690 | 53 | 6.42396092414856 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51899 | 53 | 5.892185926437378 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 56213 | 53 | 36.251091957092285 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 59770 | 53 | 51.001184940338135 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 63439 | 53 | 21.86076307296753 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51690 | 53 | 7.423050880432129 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51899 | 53 | 6.891913890838623 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 56213 | 53 | 35.252192974090576 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 59770 | 53 | 50.00228404998779 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 63439 | 53 | 20.861264944076538 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
| Key |
|---|
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize |
Show all (5 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp | C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe |
| HKEY_USERS\%SID%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp | C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp | C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp | C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.exe\OpenWithProgids\exefile | Binary Data |
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.