Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

This threat shows heavy registry manipulation (39.78% of total behavior), indicating persistent backdoor installation, configuration tampering, or system policy modification attempts. The malware likely establishes persistence mechanisms and modifies security settings to maintain long-term access.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1129 – Drops a binary and executes it
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – Executed a command line with /C or /R argument to terminate command shell on completion which can be used to hide execution
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1070 – Deletes executed files from disk
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Enumerates the modules from a process (may be used to locate base addresses in process injection)
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Terminates another process
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – A process attempted to delay the analysis task.
• T1568 – Connects to a Dynamic DNS Domain
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1064 – Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
• T1064 – Executes visual basic scripts
• T1064 – Drops VBS files to the startup folder (C:\\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Stores files to the Windows startup directory
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1055 – Writes to foreign memory regions
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – PE file has an executable .text section which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.3)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1016 – Checks the online ip address of the machine
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1105 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1095 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
• T1071 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.