9667abfd0ae1e41a483fc055be55b62e8340aa5d


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-05 11:04:56 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
uwk84.exe
Type
MS-DOS executable, MZ for MS-DOS
SHA‑1
9667abfd0ae1e41a483fc055be55b62e8340aa5d
MD5
59ed0e22761ca24e448df7ef8f457ae8
First Seen
2025-08-26 15:40:39.265281
Last Analysis
2025-08-26 17:08:06.594839
Dwell Time
0 days, 1 hours, 27 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-08-19 18:40:49 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-08-29 09:08:19 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 9 days, 14 hours, 27 minutes
2025-09-05 11:04:56 UTC Report generation time 16 days, 16 hours, 24 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 68. Missed: 5. Coverage: 93.2%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +67 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 67 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • CMC
  • TACHYON
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (56.59% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 309 56.59%
Network 192 35.16%
File System 18 3.30%
Registry 14 2.56%
Process 12 2.20%
Synchronization 1 0.18%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027.002 – packed with Mpress
  • T1129 – Drops a binary and executes it
  • T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1071 – Performs HTTP requests potentially not found in PCAP.
  • T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
  • T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
  • T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
  • T1071 – Creates a slightly modified copy of itself
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027 – Executable file is packed/obfuscated with MPRESS
  • T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – Executable file is packed/obfuscated with MPRESS
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1060 – The process has tried to set its autorun on the system startup
  • T1112 – The process has tried to set its autorun on the system startup
  • T1050 – The process has tried to set its autorun on the system startup
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 8 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.152920961380005 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 7.091490030288696 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 8.669286966323853 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 9.652472972869873 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 7.095436096191406 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 11.54253101348877 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54579 53 56.042487144470215 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62112 53 41.33934307098389 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 26.980070114135742 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 12.542428016662598 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54579 53 55.04261112213135 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62112 53 40.354432106018066 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 25.980200052261353 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

5

Registry Set

5

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp
Show all (5 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe
HKEY_USERS\%SID%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\microsofthelp C:\Windows\microsofthelp.exe
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.exe\OpenWithProgids\exefile Binary Data

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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