Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
---|---|---|
2025-09-04 12:21:15 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
2025-09-09 07:38:15 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 4 days, 19 hours, 17 minutes |
2025-09-18 06:46:39 UTC | Report generation time | 13 days, 18 hours, 25 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 20. Coverage: 72.6%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +52 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 52 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- google_safebrowsing
- Jiangmin
- MaxSecure
- NANO-Antivirus
- SentinelOne
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- VBA32
- ViRobot
- Webroot
- Yandex
- Zillya
- ZoneAlarm
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1059 – accept command line arguments
- T1083 – enumerate files recursively
- T1082 – check OS version
- T1125 – capture webcam image
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1010 – find graphical window
- T1547.009 – create shortcut via IShellLink
- T1083 – get file system object information
- T1082 – get disk size
- T1083 – get file size
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
- T1112 – delete registry value
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1529 – shutdown system
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1115 – open clipboard
- T1112 – delete registry key
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
- T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
- T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|---|
www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.20 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
Observed IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
239.255.255.250 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
Request | Type |
---|---|
www.msftncsi.com | A |
5isohu.com | A |
www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
239.255.255.250 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
Port | Count | Protocols |
---|---|---|
137 | 1 | udp |
138 | 1 | udp |
5355 | 5 | udp |
53 | 29 | udp |
3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
192.168.56.11 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.2447171211242676 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 192.168.56.255 | 138 | 138 | 9.244832038879395 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 49563 | 5355 | 3.1734721660614014 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 54650 | 5355 | 3.17569899559021 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 55601 | 5355 | 4.159927129745483 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 60205 | 5355 | 3.1833391189575195 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 62798 | 5355 | 5.739126205444336 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 239.255.255.250 | 62184 | 3702 | 3.1812641620635986 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51628 | 53 | 112.3534791469574 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51663 | 53 | 173.68212413787842 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51690 | 53 | 6.72562313079834 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51899 | 53 | 5.744541168212891 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 56213 | 53 | 36.431467056274414 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 56473 | 53 | 97.99396705627441 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 58917 | 53 | 79.74391603469849 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 59770 | 53 | 51.00975513458252 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 60334 | 53 | 126.71315908432007 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 61507 | 53 | 144.96276211738586 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 62120 | 53 | 159.32369017601013 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 62329 | 53 | 65.38462710380554 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 63439 | 53 | 22.072094202041626 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 63550 | 53 | 191.93164610862732 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51628 | 53 | 111.35402417182922 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51663 | 53 | 172.68220615386963 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51690 | 53 | 7.713032007217407 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51880 | 53 | 205.30687499046326 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51899 | 53 | 6.744014024734497 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 56213 | 53 | 35.43210506439209 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 56473 | 53 | 96.9948480129242 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 58917 | 53 | 78.74487400054932 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 59770 | 53 | 50.010375022888184 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 60334 | 53 | 125.71333599090576 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 61507 | 53 | 143.96378111839294 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 62120 | 53 | 158.322603225708 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 62329 | 53 | 64.38502407073975 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 63439 | 53 | 21.0728600025177 | udp |
192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 63550 | 53 | 190.93300104141235 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.