Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 3+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 40. Missed: 33. Coverage: 54.8%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (34.76% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1059.001 – run PowerShell expression
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1539 – Touches a file containing cookies, possibly for information gathering
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1059.001 – run PowerShell expression
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1047 – Queries process information (via WMI, Win32_Process)
• T1047 – Creates processes via WMI
• T1059 – Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
• T1059 – Obfuscated command line found
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1140 – Obfuscated command line found
• T1218.005 – Creates HTA files
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries process information (via WMI, Win32_Process)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Reads internet explorer settings
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1114 – Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
• T1105 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1095 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.