Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

This threat shows heavy registry manipulation (34.49% of total behavior), indicating persistent backdoor installation, configuration tampering, or system policy modification attempts. The malware likely establishes persistence mechanisms and modifies security settings to maintain long-term access.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1083 – get file size
• T1555.003 – get Chrome CookieMonster
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1064 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1064 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1059 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1059.001 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
• T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
• T1055 – Modifies control flow of another process
• T1059.001 – Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
• T1083 – Possibly does reconnaissance
• T1124 – Tries to detect analyzer sandbox
• T1497.003 – Tries to detect analyzer sandbox
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1059.001 – Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1055 – Writes to foreign memory regions
• T1055 – Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
• T1055 – Allocates memory in foreign processes
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1497 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
• T1518.001 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.