Advanced Ransomware Performing WMI And BIOS Environment Checks


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-04 08:31:07 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
g7l3u4.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
b9946a00e165e356701236b0ebe97734e7895b86
MD5
ef3c0dd9ae335e805bc318020fc0bfb9
First Seen
2025-12-01 14:09:01.283647
Last Analysis
2025-12-01 21:28:48.035088
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-13 13:05:25 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-03 21:11:59 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 20 days, 8 hours, 6 minutes
2025-12-04 08:31:07 UTC Report generation time 20 days, 19 hours, 25 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 50. Missed: 23. Coverage: 68.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +49 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 49 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • ALYac
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Tencent
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • TrendMicro-HouseCall
  • VBA32
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (59.09% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 247 59.09%
Registry 105 25.12%
Process 40 9.57%
File System 17 4.07%
Hooking 9 2.15%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1490 – delete Windows backup catalog
  • T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
  • T1112 – delete registry value
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1071 – A process attempted to delay the analysis task.
  • T1071 – Terminates another process
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1490 – delete Windows backup catalog
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
  • T1112 – delete registry value
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1047 – Queries BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios)
  • T1047 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
  • T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
  • T1497 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1518.001 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
  • T1082 – Queries BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios)
  • T1082 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 15 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.929839134216309 udp
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 138 138 13.929532051086426 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 10.414255142211914 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 7.858073949813843 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 9.869359970092773 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 7.860109090805054 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 8.288486003875732 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 7.865925073623657 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 12.42972207069397 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 10.85141110420227 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57310 53 69.67969417572021 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57415 53 84.05471205711365 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58697 53 26.241826057434082 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62493 53 55.3205029964447 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62849 53 40.66406297683716 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 13.429842948913574 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 11.835605144500732 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57310 53 68.68333697319031 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57415 53 83.06928610801697 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58697 53 25.24227213859558 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58920 53 101.3261079788208 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62493 53 54.33438301086426 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62849 53 39.66456198692322 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

27

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\svchost.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\svchost.exe
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\advanced_ransomware.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
Show all (27 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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