Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 10. Coverage: 86.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.92% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1112 – Creates or sets a registry key to a long series of bytes, possibly to store a binary or malware config

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.