Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 13. Coverage: 81.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.89% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1082 – get MAC address in .NET
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1562 – set TCP connection state
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1553.005 – bypass Mark of the Web
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1555.003 – gather chrome based browser login information
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1010 – enumerate gui resources
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1083 – get file size
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1016 – get domain information
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1016 – get networking interfaces
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1213 – reference SQL statements
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1012 – Query OS Information
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1053.005 – Schedules task
• T1053.005 – Schedules task via schtasks
• T1055 – Injects a file into another process
• T1056 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
• T1056.001 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1056.004 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1071.004 – Performs DNS request
• T1082 – Query OS Information
• T1095 – Connects to remote host
• T1119 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1485 – Modifies operating system directory
• T1559.001 – Schedules task
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1564.004 – Obscures a file’s origin
• T1571 – Tries to connect using an uncommon port
• T1129 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1083 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1082 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1071 – The process behaves as a known keylogger (iSpy)
• T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
• T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
• T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
• T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1053 – Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.