Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.8%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.92% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1027 – .NET source code contains long base64-encoded strings
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.