Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 51. Missed: 22. Coverage: 69.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (38.11% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1027.002 – packed with Confuser
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1070.006 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1070 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1047 – Queries port and connector information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1027 – .NET source code contains long base64-encoded strings
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1518.001 – Queries port and connector information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.