Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 19. Coverage: 73.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (49.34% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1057 – get process heap flags
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – get memory capacity
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1071 – Dynamic (imported) function loading detected
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.