BQTLock Ransomware Evolves With Enhanced Privilege Abuse and Stealthy Network Beaconing


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:26:55 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
e43yd7iyw.exe
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
5fba9b5e0606b5154041b0ffa059e0028e69817b
MD5
020d888236be6a7fffa99c7f35bf2797
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:15:34.691804
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:16.820988
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-10-15 04:36:05 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:44:58 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 35 days, 8 hours, 8 minutes
2025-11-20 08:26:55 UTC Report generation time 36 days, 3 hours, 50 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.4%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +54 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 54 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Panda
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • VBA32
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.218.218.158 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2415101528167725 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.757764101028442 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.1903741359710693 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.181126117706299 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.2026491165161133 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.74995493888855 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.212388038635254 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.741959095001221 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 7.320130109786987 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.750302076339722 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 8.303203105926514 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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