Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 12+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 61. Missed: 12. Coverage: 83.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (49.06% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1547.009 – persist via lnk shortcut
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – HTTP traffic contains suspicious features which may be indicative of malware related traffic
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1012 – Query OS Information
• T1016 – Checks external IP address
• T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
• T1047 – Collects hardware properties
• T1047 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1059.001 – Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
• T1071.004 – Performs DNS request
• T1082 – Collects hardware properties
• T1082 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1082 – Query OS Information
• T1095 – Connects to remote host
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1497.001 – Tries to detect application sandbox
• T1562.001 – Modifies Windows Defender configuration
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.