c94294c463ad1dc088d2eff36c9f2fd49376fcb7


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-12 11:59:10 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
c94294c463ad1dc088d2eff36c9f2fd49376fcb7
Type
Win32 EXE
SHA‑1
c94294c463ad1dc088d2eff36c9f2fd49376fcb7
MD5
ee54f01052dd1aa98e3ff153d7d990ec
First Seen
2025-09-05 07:15:43.987080
Last Analysis
2025-09-05 10:02:36.242440
Dwell Time
0 days, 2 hours, 46 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-03 17:32:17 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-09 07:40:40 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 5 days, 14 hours, 8 minutes
2025-09-12 11:59:10 UTC Report generation time 8 days, 18 hours, 26 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 49. Missed: 24. Coverage: 67.1%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +48 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 48 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • AhnLab-V3
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • Elastic
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Rising
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (64.80% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 13609 64.80%
System 4735 22.54%
Misc 2466 11.74%
Registry 105 0.50%
Process 75 0.36%
Synchronization 4 0.02%
Windows 3 0.01%
Hooking 2 0.01%
Threading 2 0.01%
Device 2 0.01%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
  • T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
  • T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
  • T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1486 – Exhibits possible ransomware or wiper file modification behavior: overwrites_existing_files
  • T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 12 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2445459365844727 udp
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.24401593208313 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.730337142944336 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.172884941101074 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.563097953796387 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1778459548950195 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 5.1827239990234375 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.18105411529541 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 8.187572002410889 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 7.747456073760986 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57310 53 67.11895513534546 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58697 53 23.619596004486084 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62493 53 52.71294903755188 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62849 53 37.9936420917511 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 9.182317972183228 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 8.743550062179565 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57310 53 66.11958003044128 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58697 53 22.619247913360596 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62493 53 51.713135957717896 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62849 53 36.994117975234985 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

17

Registry Set

3

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\CLPPTH
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OOBE\LaunchUserOOBE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\crypt32\DiagMatchAnyMask
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4005801669-2598574594-602355426-1001
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OOBE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\crypt32\DiagLevel
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 1\CertDllOpenStoreProv
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 1
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CertDllOpenStoreProv\Ldap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CertDllOpenStoreProv\#16
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CertDllOpenStoreProv
Show all (17 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\CLPPTH C:\Users\Bruno\AppData\Roaming\CLPPTH\clppth.exe
HKEY_USERS\%SID%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\CLPPTH %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\CLPPTH\clppth.exe
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.exe\OpenWithProgids\exefile Binary Data

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

Scroll to Top