Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
---|---|---|
2025-09-04 07:07:58 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
2025-09-09 07:40:47 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 5 days, 0 hours, 32 minutes |
2025-09-09 10:40:39 UTC | Report generation time | 5 days, 3 hours, 32 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.8%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +58 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 58 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- Jiangmin
- SentinelOne
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- Webroot
- Zillya
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Dominant system-level operations (52.86% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
Category | Weight | Percentage |
---|---|---|
System | 231 | 52.86% |
File System | 151 | 34.55% |
Registry | 22 | 5.03% |
Process | 17 | 3.89% |
Windows | 5 | 1.14% |
Misc | 3 | 0.69% |
Synchronization | 3 | 0.69% |
Threading | 2 | 0.46% |
Device | 2 | 0.46% |
Hooking | 1 | 0.23% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1082 – get memory capacity
- T1547.009 – create shortcut via IShellLink
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1033 – get token membership
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1105 – download and write a file
- T1115 – open clipboard
- T1083 – get file version info
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1083 – enumerate files recursively
- T1056.001 – log keystrokes
- T1083 – get file size
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1134 – acquire debug privileges
- T1082 – get disk size
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1059 – compiled with AutoIt
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1112 – delete registry key
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
- T1016 – get socket status
- T1010 – enumerate gui resources
- T1134.001 – impersonate user
- T1529 – shutdown system
- T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
- T1564.003 – hide graphical window
- T1497.002 – check for unmoving mouse cursor
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1010 – find graphical window
- T1115 – list drag and drop files
- T1082 – get COMSPEC environment variable
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1113 – capture screenshot
- T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1115 – read clipboard data
- T1057 – enumerate processes
- T1518 – enumerate processes
- T1112 – delete registry value
- T1027 – encode data using Base64
- T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
- T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
- T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
- T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
- T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
- T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
- T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
- T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
- T1071 – Detected HTTP requests to some non white-listed domains
- T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
- T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|---|
www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
Observed IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
Request | Type |
---|---|
5isohu.com | A |
www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
Port | Count | Protocols |
---|---|---|
137 | 1 | udp |
5355 | 4 | udp |
53 | 4 | udp |
UDP Packets
Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
192.168.56.14 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.0781807899475098 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 51209 | 5355 | 3.018996000289917 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 53401 | 5355 | 4.755281925201416 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 55094 | 5355 | 5.578859806060791 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 55848 | 5355 | 3.0236477851867676 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 52815 | 53 | 7.325187921524048 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 65148 | 53 | 22.749995946884155 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 52815 | 53 | 8.31279993057251 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 65148 | 53 | 21.750322818756104 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
14
0
1
0
Registry Opened (Top 25)
Key |
---|
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Mouse\SwapMouseButtons |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AutoIt v3\AutoIt |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Mouse |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ProgramFilesDir |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize |
Show all (14 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
Services Started (Top 15)
Service |
---|
VaultSvc |
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.