cff38b78cd35f04bd67e3c173fc3311e73fb4486


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-17 06:57:52 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
99aaf486011bb3251113cc4a3beb4ba7
Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
cff38b78cd35f04bd67e3c173fc3311e73fb4486
MD5
99aaf486011bb3251113cc4a3beb4ba7
First Seen
2025-09-15 22:17:13.748764
Last Analysis
2025-09-16 07:14:57.423182
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 8+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2024-10-30 14:49:48 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 13:19:09 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 323 days, 22 hours, 29 minutes
2025-10-17 06:57:52 UTC Report generation time 351 days, 16 hours, 8 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 50. Missed: 22. Coverage: 69.4%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +49 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 49 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (34.38% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 109 34.38%
Registry 102 32.18%
Process 70 22.08%
File System 22 6.94%
Synchronization 7 2.21%
Misc 2 0.63%
Windows 2 0.63%
Device 2 0.63%
Hooking 1 0.32%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1057 – get process heap force flags
  • T1129 – get kernel32 base address
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1016.001 – check Internet connectivity via WinINet
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1112 – delete registry value
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1112 – delete registry key
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
  • T1555.004 – acquire credentials from Windows Credential Manager
  • T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1027 – encrypt data using DES via WinAPI
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1082 – check OS version
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 via WinAPI
  • T1083 – get file version info
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
  • T1562 – Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms.
  • T1562.001 – Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities.
  • T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
  • T1036 – Creates files inside the system directory
  • T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
  • T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions
  • T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
  • T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
  • T1518.001 – AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
  • T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
  • T1082 – Reads software policies
  • T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 6 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2449429035186768 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1744768619537354 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.176995038986206 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.238025903701782 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.184938907623291 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.7336649894714355 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1829400062561035 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.808068037033081 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.744788885116577 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 22.2293119430542 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.807476997375488 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.744657039642334 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 21.23015809059143 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

65

Registry Set

32

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\safer\codeidentifiers\AuthenticodeEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\WerFault.exe
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\Cache
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\safer\codeidentifiers\TransparentEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug\Debugger
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\msasn1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack\DataStore_V1.0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsStore
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack\SurrogateFallback\Segoe UI
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\CTF\Compatibility\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Input
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OOBE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\loaddll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
\REGISTRY\A\{afa159a3-3a30-65a0-6dfb-ebf4240cdc19}\Root
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
Show all (65 total)
Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\Packages
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\FontLink\SystemLink
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\OEM
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\CTF\
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack\SurrogateFallback
\REGISTRY\A\{afa159a3-3a30-65a0-6dfb-ebf4240cdc19}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\msasn1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CTF\DirectSwitchHotkeys

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
\REGISTRY\A\{afa159a3-3a30-65a0-6dfb-ebf4240cdc19}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\PermissionsCheckTestKey
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\PermissionsCheckTestKey
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\{11517B7C-E79D-4e20-961B-75A811715ADD}
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\AmiHivePermissionsCorrect 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\AmiHiveOwnerCorrect 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations \??\C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp!\??\C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\AmiOverridePath C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\WritePermissionsCheck 1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\ProviderSyncId {6cd420f7-0ee5-431f-9e22-79db81ab5c64}
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\ProgramId 0000f519feec486de87ed73cb92d3cac802400000000
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\FileId 0000bcc5dc3222034d3f257f1fd35889e5be90f09b5f
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\LowerCaseLongPath c:\windows\syswow64\rundll32.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\LongPathHash rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Name rundll32.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Publisher microsoft corporation
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Version 10.0.17134.1 (winbuild.160101.0800)
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\BinFileVersion 10.0.17134.1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\BinaryType pe32_i386
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\ProductName microsoft. windows. operating system
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\ProductVersion 10.0.17134.1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\LinkDate 01/30/1986 11:42:44
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\BinProductVersion 10.0.17134.1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Size 00 F2 00 00 00 00 00 00
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Language 1033
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\IsPeFile 1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\IsOsComponent 1
\REGISTRY\A\{e02b9d88-5a8e-a71e-564e-e2a42002dd22}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\rundll32.exe|ccf370e740f0e788\Usn 20 05 00 1E 00 00 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\ExceptionRecord 05 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 2B 58 27 02 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 05 2B 58 27 00 00 00 00 00 0

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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