Credential-Stealing Trojan Embeds TinyNuke Loader via Fake System Path


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-12 22:16:57 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
g67kpfx.exe
Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
faf526b65f81f40c87627248430f1ef34dc4d909
MD5
f7904bf54598a9d6e54782e53e11167a
First Seen
2025-10-05 13:13:40.060138
Last Analysis
2025-10-06 12:55:26.728552
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 23+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-20 22:23:58 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-10-08 14:13:34 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 17 days, 15 hours, 49 minutes
2025-11-12 22:16:57 UTC Report generation time 45 days, 8 hours, 52 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 51. Missed: 22. Coverage: 69.9%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +50 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 50 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • AhnLab-V3
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (52.13% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 147 52.13%
Process 82 29.08%
File System 27 9.57%
Registry 24 8.51%
Threading 1 0.35%
Windows 1 0.35%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1560.002 – compress data via WinAPI
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1016 – get socket status
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1125 – capture webcam image
  • T1071 – The PE file contains a suspicious PDB path
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
  • T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions
  • T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
  • T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
  • T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.31 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2444868087768555 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1734018325805664 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.1757187843322754 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 3.7353718280792236 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1836178302764893 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.948358774185181 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1813809871673584 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.556795835494995 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.9942848682403564 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.556911945343018 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.994174003601074 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

41

Registry Set

9

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\loaddll64.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\System\DNSClient
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DnsClient
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\VFW
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
Show all (41 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\ProgramId 00065fe1f73225e8c2331b8d373d3f91ac420000ffff
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\FileId 0000f232e0decd548852fa6089e195431b73e94ed0bd
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\LowerCaseLongPath c:\windows\system32\loaddll64.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\Name loaddll64.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\BinaryType pe64_amd64
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\LinkDate 09/15/2023 08:23:40
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\Size 00 88 02 00 00 00 00 00
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\Language 0
\REGISTRY\A\{e9372685-82f1-2557-adde-47b4fdb90761}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\loaddll64.exe|f3d72086358f9008\Usn 90 9D B6 0F 00 00 00 00

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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