Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (48.22% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get file size
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1134 – acquire debug privileges
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1057 – get process heap flags
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1053.002 – schedule task via at
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1007 – query service status
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1543.003 – start service
• T1543.003 – delete service
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
• T1016 – Reads network adapter information
• T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
• T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
• T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
• T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
• T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
• T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
• T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
• T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
• T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
• T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
• T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
• T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
• T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.