Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 20. Coverage: 72.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (51.81% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1057 – get process heap flags
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – get memory capacity
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 via WinAPI
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Dynamic (imported) function loading detected
• T1071 – Performs some HTTP requests
• T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1082 – Reads software policies

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.