Enterprise Privilege Escalation Chains Power High-Impact DevMan Ransomware Campaigns


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-01-29 15:20:55 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
ntdll.dll
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
9bddf7dbc3b3c1632f41e2cc7949007c51e16c9e
MD5
cda6134efa7ee6d95a466190f84a25fe
First Seen
2026-01-29 08:26:40.800508
Last Analysis
2026-01-29 10:11:11.661282
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2026-01-05 14:02:24 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-01-29 14:01:07 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 23 days, 23 hours, 58 minutes
2026-01-29 15:20:55 UTC Report generation time 24 days, 1 hours, 18 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.2%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +56 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • ALYac
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • F-Secure
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • TACHYON
  • Xcitium
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Significant process manipulation (43.03% of behavior) suggests code injection, process hollowing, or privilege escalation techniques. The malware is actively compromising running processes to hide its activities.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
Process 3252 43.03%
Registry 3021 39.97%
System 762 10.08%
File System 309 4.09%
Services 96 1.27%
Device 57 0.75%
Threading 17 0.22%
Com 15 0.20%
Synchronization 10 0.13%
Windows 7 0.09%
Hooking 6 0.08%
Misc 4 0.05%
Crypto 2 0.03%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1053.002 – schedule task via at
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1007 – query service status
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
  • T1543.003 – delete service
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1543.003 – stop service
  • T1489 – stop service
  • T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
  • T1016 – Reads network adapter information
  • T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
  • T1057 – Enumerates running processes
  • T1134 – Enables process privileges
  • T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
  • T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
  • T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
  • T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
  • T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
  • T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
  • T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
  • T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
  • T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
  • T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1082 – Queries for the computername
  • T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.219.36.101 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2440929412841797 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.7320568561553955 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.1758768558502197 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.40192985534668 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.178696870803833 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 3.929898977279663 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1870198249816895 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 8.05835485458374 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.730898857116699 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 9.056291818618774 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.7284369468688965 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

61

Services Started

1

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\Circular Kernel Context Logger\Status 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\Age 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\BufferSize 64
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\ClockType 2
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\FlushTimer 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\Guid {639eade2-9051-5ddc-d208-b51afd9e984b}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\LogFileMode 285213056
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\MaximumBuffers 64
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\MinimumBuffers 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\OwningChannel Application
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\Start 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\EnableLevel 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\EnableProperty 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\Enabled 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\LoggerName EventLog-Application
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\MatchAllKeyword 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{7b7838a3-6562-4269-bb7a-97b0d9593882}\MatchAnyKeyword 9223372036854775808
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\EnableLevel 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\EnableProperty 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\Enabled 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\LoggerName EventLog-Application
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\MatchAllKeyword 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Application\{b977cf02-76f6-df84-cc1a-6a4b232322b6}\MatchAnyKeyword 10376293541461622784
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\Age 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\BufferSize 64
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\ClockType 2
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\FlushTimer 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\Guid {0e66e20b-b802-ba6a-9272-31199d0ed295}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\LogFileMode 268435904
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\MaximumBuffers 16
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\MinimumBuffers 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\OwningChannel Security
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-Security\Start 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\Age 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\BufferSize 64
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\ClockType 2
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\FlushTimer 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\Guid {fa5ae656-8e4a-ac95-0980-4eb8342436d8}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\LogFileMode 268435840
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\MaximumBuffers 16
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\MinimumBuffers 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\OwningChannel System
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\AutoLogger\EventLog-System\Start 1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\Security\0e66e20b-b802-ba6a-9272-31199d0ed295 01 00 04 80 A4 00 00 00 B4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 90 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 FF FF 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 FF FD 00 00 01 06 00 00 00 00 00 05 50 00 00 00 23 90 7C 34 41 78 E1 6E 77 8D C4 1C 99 3C 33 A6 8A 68 D6 5B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\Security\639eade2-9051-5ddc-d208-b51afd9e984b 01 00 04 80 24 01 00 00 34 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 10 01 0A 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 00 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 18 00 00 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 25 02 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 04 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 03 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 21 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 FF FF 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 7F FF 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 28 00 FF FF 00 00 01 06 00 00 00 00 00 05 50 00 00 00 23 90 7C 34 41 78 E1 6E 77 8D C4 1C 99 3C 33 A6 8A 68 D6 5B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\Security\fa5ae656-8e4a-ac95-0980-4eb8342436d8 01 00 04 80 3C 01 00 00 4C 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02 00 28 01 08 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 00 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 18 00 00 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 27 02 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 02 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 21 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 FF FF 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 00 00 18 00 7F FF 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 00 00 28 00 FF FF 00 00 01 06 00 00 00 00 00 05 50 00 00 00 23 90 7C 34 41 78 E1 6E 77 8D C4 1C 99 3C 33 A6 8A 68 D6 5B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 20 0
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\Capabilities
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\Class
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\ClassGUID
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\ConfigFlags
Show all (61 total)
Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\DeviceDesc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\Legacy
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MPSDRV\0000\Service
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\Capabilities
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\Class
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\ClassGUID
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\ConfigFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\DeviceDesc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\Legacy
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Deleted Device IDs\System&CurrentControlSet&Enum&Root&LEGACY_MPSDRV&0000\Service
\\Registry\Machine\COMPONENTS\ServicingStackVersions\6.1.7601.24537 (win7sp1_ldr_escrow.191114-1547)

Services Started (Top 15)

Service
SNMPTRAP

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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