Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 25. Coverage: 65.8%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (76.18% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1083 – enumerate files recursively
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1083 – get file size
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1562 – Attempts to disable Windows Defender
• T1562 – Attempts to modify Windows Defender using PowerShell
• T1036 – Attempts to mimic the file extension of a JPG image by having ‘jpg’ in the file name.
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1064 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1562.001 – Attempts to disable Windows Defender
• T1562.001 – Attempts to modify Windows Defender using PowerShell
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – Attempts to disable Windows Defender
• T1059 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1059 – Attempts to modify Windows Defender using PowerShell
• T1486 – Exhibits possible ransomware or wiper file modification behavior: overwrites_existing_files
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
• T1547.001 – Drops PE files to the startup folder (C:\\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Stores files to the Windows startup directory
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Modifies Windows Defender protection settings
• T1562.001 – Disables Windows Defender
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.