f75d94b0e6cbc3cfab75056b1a1d4d10457244a1


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-09 06:57:59 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
jk7v4euax.exe
Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
f75d94b0e6cbc3cfab75056b1a1d4d10457244a1
MD5
59144e15cac8f96b33263f485a3a0ed7
First Seen
2025-09-14 13:50:48.248792
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 07:15:28.004753
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-09 23:37:16 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 07:08:31 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 9 days, 7 hours, 31 minutes
2025-10-09 06:57:59 UTC Report generation time 29 days, 7 hours, 20 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +54 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 54 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • Kaspersky
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (53.01% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 1833 53.01%
File System 1566 45.29%
Registry 17 0.49%
Process 14 0.40%
Device 8 0.23%
Network 7 0.20%
Misc 5 0.14%
Threading 3 0.09%
Hooking 2 0.06%
Services 2 0.06%
Synchronization 1 0.03%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1027 – reference AES constants
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
  • T1012 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1059 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1112 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1222 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1547.009 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1529 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1082 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1027 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1115 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1129 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1134 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1083 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1125 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1497.001 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1010 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1059 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1112 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1222 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1547.009 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1529 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1027 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1115 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1125 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1497.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1010 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
  • T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1059 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1112 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1222 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1547.009 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1529 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1027 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1115 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1125 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1497.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1010 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
  • T1012 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1059 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1112 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1222 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1547.009 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1529 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1082 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1027 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1115 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1129 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1134 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1083 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1125 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1497.001 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1010 – The binary presents some anomalies in its PE header and/or PE sections.
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 12 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2606360912323 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.18881893157959 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.191102981567383 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 3.6100010871887207 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.199207067489624 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.760791063308716 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1967709064483643 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.261023044586182 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.900987863540649 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 21.68224000930786 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 59770 53 24.041908979415894 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62329 53 36.041308879852295 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 8.666522979736328 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.260138988494873 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.901294946670532 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 20.683223962783813 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 59770 53 23.042407989501953 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62329 53 35.04180598258972 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 9.667064905166626 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

34

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\5db163b737878830554592cdcf8b4deff6a8861b863e036507f66940.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
Show all (34 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

Scroll to Top