fa18d9f3dcce10e6380dd318a9a70f63f8acf420


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-09 10:37:33 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
systemmail32.exe
Type
Win32 EXE
SHA‑1
fa18d9f3dcce10e6380dd318a9a70f63f8acf420
MD5
b44fe1eed80ca76b19c3040962c6d5ac
First Seen
2025-09-05 07:17:41.277812
Last Analysis
2025-09-05 10:02:37.317551
Dwell Time
0 days, 2 hours, 44 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-03 01:19:01 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-09 07:41:55 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 6 days, 6 hours, 22 minutes
2025-09-09 10:37:33 UTC Report generation time 6 days, 9 hours, 18 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +54 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 54 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • Jiangmin
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • TrendMicro
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (88.06% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 59 88.06%
Process 4 5.97%
File System 2 2.99%
Registry 2 2.99%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027.002 – packed with generic packer
  • T1027.002 – packed with UPX
  • T1005 – Searches for sensitive browser data
  • T1005 – Reads sensitive browser data
  • T1010 – Monitors user input
  • T1012 – Reads system data
  • T1012 – Possibly does reconnaissance
  • T1016 – Reads network adapter information
  • T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
  • T1016 – Combination of other detections shows configuration discovery
  • T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
  • T1047 – Collects hardware properties
  • T1047 – Queries OS version via WMI
  • T1056 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
  • T1056.002 – Monitors user input
  • T1057 – Enumerates running processes
  • T1059.001 – Creates a Process with redirected Input and Output
  • T1071.004 – Performs DNS request
  • T1082 – Reads system data
  • T1082 – Collects hardware properties
  • T1082 – Queries OS version via WMI
  • T1082 – Combination of other detections shows configuration discovery
  • T1083 – Searches for sensitive browser data
  • T1083 – Reads sensitive browser data
  • T1083 – Possibly does reconnaissance
  • T1095 – Sets up server that accepts incoming connections
  • T1113 – Takes screenshot
  • T1119 – Searches for sensitive browser data
  • T1119 – Reads sensitive browser data
  • T1119 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
  • T1552.001 – Searches for sensitive browser data
  • T1552.001 – Reads sensitive browser data
  • T1559 – Creates a Process with redirected Input and Output
  • T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 2 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.078552007675171 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.0105819702148438 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 5.0084240436553955 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.563446998596191 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.539680004119873 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.859544038772583 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.859112024307251 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

27

Registry Set

1

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Volatile-KeyRoam-EXCLUSIVE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM\EnableObjectValidation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wbem\Scripting
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wbem\Scripting\Default Impersonation Level
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WBEM
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wbem\Scripting\Default Namespace
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\PowerShell\3\PowerShellEngine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\AppContext
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\XML
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework\DbgDACSkipVerifyDlls
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment\__PSLockdownPolicy
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\PowerShell\appcompat
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\ProtectedEventLogging
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\tg\shell\open\command
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\XML
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Valve\Steam
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WBEM\AmsiEnable
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\PowerShell\3\PowerShellEngine\ApplicationBase
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\PowerShell
Show all (27 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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