Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 3+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 19. Coverage: 73.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.52% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027.002 – packed with Confuser
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Creates known Quasar mutexes
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1106 – .NET source code references suspicious native API functions
• T1055 – .NET source code contains process injector
• T1036 – Icon mismatch, binary includes an Icon from a different legit application in order to fool users
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027.002 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – PE file has an executable .text section which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.3)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.