Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 52. Missed: 21. Coverage: 71.2%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (45.61% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1027 – hash data via BCrypt
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1082 – get memory capacity
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1082 – get memory capacity
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1055 – write process memory
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – hash data via BCrypt
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.