Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 4+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-10-05 01:45:35 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-10-08 14:09:33 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 3 days, 12 hours, 23 minutes |
| 2025-11-12 07:16:32 UTC | Report generation time | 31 days, 5 hours, 30 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 68. Missed: 5. Coverage: 93.2%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +67 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 67 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- CMC
- Paloalto
- TrendMicro
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Dominant system-level operations (66.67% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
| Category | Weight | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| System | 9932 | 66.67% |
| File System | 1528 | 10.26% |
| Process | 764 | 5.13% |
| Misc | 573 | 3.85% |
| Threading | 382 | 2.56% |
| Device | 382 | 2.56% |
| Registry | 382 | 2.56% |
| Services | 382 | 2.56% |
| Hooking | 191 | 1.28% |
| Windows | 191 | 1.28% |
| Crypto | 191 | 1.28% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1033 – get token membership
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1129 – link many functions at runtime
- T1083 – get file size
- T1027 – manually build AES constants
- T1057 – get process heap flags
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1497 – check for VM using instruction VPCEXT
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1053.005 – schedule task via ITaskScheduler
- T1543.003 – start service
- T1543.003 – modify service
- T1569.002 – modify service
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.