Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 8+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 44. Missed: 28. Coverage: 61.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – get hostname
• T1027 – encrypt or decrypt data via BCrypt
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 via WinAPI
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1033 – get token membership
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – encode data using Base64 via WinAPI
• T1564.003 – hide graphical window
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1059.003 – execute shell command and capture output
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1071 – The PE file contains a suspicious PDB path
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.