Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.5%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.87% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1115 – read clipboard data
• T1115 – clear clipboard data
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1005 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1012 – Query OS Information
• T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
• T1047 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1047 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1056.001 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1056.004 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Query OS Information
• T1082 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1083 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1083 – Possibly does reconnaissance
• T1095 – Connects to remote host
• T1119 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1518.001 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1552.001 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027 – .NET source code contains long base64-encoded strings
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1056 – Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
• T1124 – Potential time zone aware malware
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.