Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 63. Missed: 10. Coverage: 86.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1082 – get MAC address in .NET
• T1016 – get domain information
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1555.003 – gather chrome based browser login information
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1083 – get file size
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1213 – reference SQL statements
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1553.005 – bypass Mark of the Web
• T1016 – get networking interfaces
• T1562 – set TCP connection state
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1010 – enumerate gui resources
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1036 – Attempts to move, copy or rename a command line or scripting utility likely for evasion
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1071 – The process behaves as a known keylogger (iSpy)
• T1053 – Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1056 – Installs a global keyboard hook
• T1056 – Sample has functionality to log and monitor keystrokes, analyze it with the keystroke simulation cookbook
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.