Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (68.42% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1047 – Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1047 – Queries process information (via WMI, Win32_Process)
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1497 – Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1497 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1003 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
• T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1056 – Sample has functionality to log and monitor keystrokes, analyze it with the keystroke simulation cookbook
• T1056 – Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1518.001 – Switches to a customs stack to bypass stack traces
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1082 – Switches to a customs stack to bypass stack traces
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries process information (via WMI, Win32_Process)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1005 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.