MuddyWater-Linked Stagecomp Sample Executes Persistence via WebView2 Masquerading

  • May 8, 2026
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Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-05-08 14:17:45 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
Game.exe
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
559052799a52d1b29ac7e87935e9a0c80df5fb16
MD5
2115e69f71d9f51a6c6c2effdaee2df2
First Seen
2026-05-08 13:12:40.261668
Last Analysis
2026-05-08 13:20:54.141833
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 8+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents extremely rapid detection within minutes.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2026-03-02 21:14:34 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-05-08 13:54:25 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 66 days, 16 hours, 39 minutes
2026-05-08 14:17:45 UTC Report generation time 66 days, 17 hours, 3 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 49. Missed: 23. Coverage: 68.1%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +48 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 48 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Alibaba
  • APEX
  • Avira
  • Bkav
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • Cylance
  • Elastic
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • Kingsoft
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • Xcitium
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1140 – decode data using Base64 via WinAPI
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt data via BCrypt
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1547.001 – get startup folder
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64 via WinAPI
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.219.36.108 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2441751956939697 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.729946136474609 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.1749470233917236 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.183300018310547 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1797211170196533 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 3.9151651859283447 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1835691928863525 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.744641065597534 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.482893228530884 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.744379997253418 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.478604078292847 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

8

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
Show all (8 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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