Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-14 22:03:39 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-11-19 12:49:17 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 127 days, 14 hours, 45 minutes |
| 2025-11-20 08:38:05 UTC | Report generation time | 128 days, 10 hours, 34 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +55 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- APEX
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- google_safebrowsing
- Gridinsoft
- NANO-Antivirus
- Skyhigh
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- VBA32
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1083 – get file size
- T1082 – get disk size
- T1047 – connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1113 – capture screenshot
- T1134 – acquire debug privileges
- T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
- T1098 – add user account to group
- T1057 – enumerate processes
- T1518 – enumerate processes
- T1070.004 – self delete
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1055.012 – use process replacement
- T1620 – use process replacement
- T1136 – add user account
- T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1531 – delete user account
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
- T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
- T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
- T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
- T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
- T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
- T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
- T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
- T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.71 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type |
|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | A |
| 5isohu.com | A |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 5 | udp |
| 53 | 4 | udp |
| 3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.11 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.2443740367889404 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 49563 | 5355 | 3.173309087753296 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 54650 | 5355 | 3.177833080291748 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 55601 | 5355 | 4.122767925262451 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 60205 | 5355 | 3.1836400032043457 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 224.0.0.252 | 62798 | 5355 | 5.737987041473389 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 239.255.255.250 | 62184 | 3702 | 3.1811699867248535 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51690 | 53 | 6.698663949966431 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.4.4 | 51899 | 53 | 5.746432065963745 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51690 | 53 | 7.697751998901367 | udp |
| 192.168.56.11 | 8.8.8.8 | 51899 | 53 | 6.744658946990967 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
4
0
0
0
Registry Opened (Top 25)
| Key |
|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager |
Show all (4 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
