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Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:38:05 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
afa5c27726efe4576e1161c0c17f83524a447c4f
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
afa5c27726efe4576e1161c0c17f83524a447c4f
MD5
972b1677621bbdc45ef61c56cd9909d2
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:59:20.049806
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:19.655621
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-07-14 22:03:39 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:49:17 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 127 days, 14 hours, 45 minutes
2025-11-20 08:38:05 UTC Report generation time 128 days, 10 hours, 34 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +55 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1047 – connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
  • T1098 – add user account to group
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1055.012 – use process replacement
  • T1620 – use process replacement
  • T1136 – add user account
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1531 – delete user account
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.71 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2443740367889404 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.173309087753296 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.177833080291748 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.122767925262451 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1836400032043457 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.737987041473389 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1811699867248535 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.698663949966431 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.746432065963745 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.697751998901367 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.744658946990967 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

4

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
Show all (4 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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