Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 39. Missed: 32. Coverage: 54.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1071 – The PE file contains a suspicious PDB path
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – Executed a command line with /C or /R argument to terminate command shell on completion which can be used to hide execution
• T1070 – Deletes executed files from disk
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address
• T1486 – Modifies user documents (likely ransomware behavior)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.