Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (49.31% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1047 – Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1518.001 – Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1113 – Contains functionality to capture screen (.Net source)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.