OOBE Imposter Snatches Clipboard Keys


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-27 10:20:22 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
pixhf.exe
Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
6a0ab411574b4cc4ef5b468ffac161b5ab917087
MD5
0a01b11b2fa66e35c8b77844896b454b
First Seen
2025-09-15 11:04:26.667936
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 12:20:38.435231
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-11 05:41:24 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 12:00:45 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 8 days, 6 hours, 19 minutes
2025-10-27 10:20:22 UTC Report generation time 46 days, 4 hours, 38 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 40. Missed: 32. Coverage: 55.6%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +39 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 39 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • Bkav
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cylance
  • Cynet
  • DrWeb
  • Elastic
  • F-Secure
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • Malwarebytes
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (55.65% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 64 55.65%
Process 34 29.57%
File System 7 6.09%
Misc 4 3.48%
Threading 2 1.74%
Registry 2 1.74%
Hooking 1 0.87%
Device 1 0.87%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1003 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1555 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1552 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1555.003 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1552.001 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1005 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
  • T1036 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
  • T1548 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
  • T1057 – Enumerates running processes
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
  • T1003 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
  • T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
  • T1005 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.2719011306762695 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 7.122225046157837 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 9.76038908958435 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 7.132996082305908 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 9.397728204727173 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 7.677985191345215 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 49311 53 10.709651231765747 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 12.037535190582275 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 49311 53 11.708983182907104 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 13.03702712059021 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

18

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\chromium_stealer_user.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
Show all (18 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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