Paradise 64-Bit Ransomware Payload Emerges With Heavy Overlay Packing and OpenSSL Crypto Engine


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:36:22 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
mh5m3w.exe
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
a5f17f5aa102a139dd1582666dc117e2bd1b5b41
MD5
353cb0a9a3c007a5ee3f821f3da937fc
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:58:19.631004
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:18.642259
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-08 11:48:06 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:47:46 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 11 days, 0 hours, 59 minutes
2025-11-20 08:36:22 UTC Report generation time 11 days, 20 hours, 48 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 43. Missed: 30. Coverage: 58.9%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +42 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 42 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • AhnLab-V3
  • ALYac
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cynet
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • Kaspersky
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1490 – delete Windows backup catalog
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1562.001 – disable Windows Defender features via registry on Windows
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1562.001 – disable system features via registry on Windows
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1486 – Contains functionality to drop file containing file decryption instructions (likely related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2419800758361816 udp
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.242014169692993 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.728154182434082 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.1706080436706543 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.207370042800903 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.17514705657959 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.300721168518066 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1786231994628906 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.758445978164673 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.866295099258423 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.75759220123291 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.851138114929199 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

8

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
Show all (8 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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