Paradise Ransomware Build Detected With Packed PE32+ Layout and Aggressive File-Targeting Logic


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:43:13 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
5rmll34.exe
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
fa8a91e589a19fbea6f82e8fc087d5298b2e1cb1
MD5
e3d523249bfe8c3f415eed2a89d6ad46
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:52:59.752074
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:22.997540
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-09 13:07:38 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:51:58 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 9 days, 23 hours, 44 minutes
2025-11-20 08:43:13 UTC Report generation time 10 days, 19 hours, 35 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 42. Missed: 31. Coverage: 57.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +41 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 41 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • AhnLab-V3
  • Alibaba
  • ALYac
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cynet
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1562.001 – disable Windows Defender features via registry on Windows
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1562.001 – disable system features via registry on Windows
  • T1490 – delete Windows backup catalog
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1486 – Contains functionality to drop file containing file decryption instructions (likely related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.73 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.242466926574707 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.726933002471924 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.170719861984253 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.181463956832886 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1754589080810547 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.278711795806885 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.179086923599243 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.742801904678345 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.853047847747803 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.741822004318237 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.851739883422852 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

8

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
Show all (8 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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