Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-01-05 14:02:42 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2026-01-29 14:00:44 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 23 days, 23 hours, 58 minutes |
| 2026-01-29 15:20:30 UTC | Report generation time | 24 days, 1 hours, 17 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.3%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +56 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- ALYac
- Avira
- Baidu
- CAT-QuickHeal
- ClamAV
- CMC
- F-Secure
- Gridinsoft
- Jiangmin
- TACHYON
- Xcitium
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
- T1007 – query service status
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1027 – reference Base64 string
- T1070.004 – self delete
- T1083 – get file size
- T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
- T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1057 – get process heap flags
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1134 – acquire debug privileges
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1543.003 – delete service
- T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
- T1135 – enumerate network shares
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1053.002 – schedule task via at
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1543.003 – start service
- T1057 – enumerate processes
- T1518 – enumerate processes
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
- T1543.003 – stop service
- T1489 – stop service
- T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
- T1016 – Reads network adapter information
- T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
- T1057 – Enumerates running processes
- T1134 – Enables process privileges
- T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
- T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
- T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
- T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
- T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
- T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
- T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
- T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
- T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
- T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
- T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
- T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
- T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
- T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
- T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
- T1082 – Queries for the computername
- T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
- T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
- T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
- T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
- T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
Show all (297 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
Services Started (Top 15)
| Service |
|---|
| SNMPTRAP |
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
