Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 60. Missed: 12. Coverage: 83.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (73.58% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1007 – query service status
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1106 – Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors.
• T1055 – Spawns processes
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
• T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address
• T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
• T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address
• T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.