Qilin Executes File Encryption, Spreader Behavior, and Tor-Based Extortion Workflow


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:37:48 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
7lkijfb3.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
aa8db7f331d62485aaa1888b947f6d791b1247d2
MD5
119856ec134acc86ef76044cbf291f54
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:58:07.137412
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:19.387922
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-07-29 13:37:37 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:48:44 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 112 days, 23 hours, 11 minutes
2025-11-20 08:37:48 UTC Report generation time 113 days, 19 hours, 0 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 11. Coverage: 84.9%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +61 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 61 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VirIT
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (92.88% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 274 92.88%
Process 7 2.37%
Device 6 2.03%
File System 4 1.36%
Registry 2 0.68%
Hooking 1 0.34%
Misc 1 0.34%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1027 – encrypt data using speck
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
  • T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
  • T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
  • T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
  • T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 2 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.0784058570861816 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.009183883666992 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.630576848983765 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.563326835632324 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.009814977645874 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.6566338539123535 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.656816005706787 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

35

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Volatile-KeyRoam-EXCLUSIVE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WaitToKillServiceTimeout
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\RestartManager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\UTB.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
Show all (35 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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