Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (72.13% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1529 – shutdown system
• T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
• T1007 – query service status
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.