QilinLoader Trojan Deploys Stealthy Injector to Launch Full Qilin Ransomware Payload


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:26:22 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
dbfh.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
5f09ab2decffd372ad53cacd3ca9ae9743357e32
MD5
c8d43c18b4b451e1722ebb0adbd924b5
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:59:51.696184
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:15.947495
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-08-21 12:01:10 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:44:51 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 90 days, 0 hours, 43 minutes
2025-11-20 08:26:22 UTC Report generation time 90 days, 20 hours, 25 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +53 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 53 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • VirIT
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (92.88% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 274 92.88%
Process 7 2.37%
Device 6 2.03%
File System 4 1.36%
Registry 2 0.68%
Hooking 1 0.34%
Misc 1 0.34%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – encrypt data using speck
  • T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
  • T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2446961402893066 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1772799491882324 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.1828300952911377 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.667963981628418 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.2237470149993896 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 6.245341062545776 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.225917100906372 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 8.041298151016235 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 6.35541296005249 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 9.041640043258667 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 7.354065179824829 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

3

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
Show all (3 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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