Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 16+ days, this malware remained undetected — a significant window that allowed the adversary to establish deep persistence, conduct thorough system reconnaissance, escalate privileges, and initiate data collection activities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.8%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1010 – enumerate gui resources
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1082 – get MAC address in .NET
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1016 – get domain information
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1553.005 – bypass Mark of the Web
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1213 – reference SQL statements
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1016 – get networking interfaces
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – get file size
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1555.003 – gather chrome based browser login information
• T1562 – set TCP connection state
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1071 – The process behaves as a known keylogger (iSpy)
• T1053 – Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
• T1036 – Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\\Windows)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the system directory
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.