Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-20 01:07:30 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-12-03 21:12:11 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 13 days, 20 hours, 4 minutes |
| 2025-12-04 08:32:02 UTC | Report generation time | 14 days, 7 hours, 24 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 69. Missed: 4. Coverage: 94.5%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +68 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 68 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- CMC
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- tehtris
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
- T1543.003 – start service
- T1543.003 – create service
- T1569.002 – create service
- T1083 – get file size
- T1027 – reference AES constants
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
- T1547.001 – reference startup folder
- T1543.003 – persist via Windows service
- T1569.002 – persist via Windows service
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1129 – link many functions at runtime
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.