Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 4+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 66. Missed: 7. Coverage: 90.4%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (56.85% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1614.001 – identify system language via API
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027.002 – packed with ASPack
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1129 – Drops a binary and executes it
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1036 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1548 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Likely virus infection of existing binary
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Makes a suspicious HTTP request to a commonly exploitable directory with questionable file ext
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.