Service Control Manipulation and Token Impersonation Shape DevMan Ransomware Execution


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-01-29 15:21:24 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
ntdll.dll
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
034a838f2a4490d6e2ff2911d1389eab3246a518
MD5
d3a19b7bb618fddf99ecdc73a5e9cb07
First Seen
2026-01-29 08:05:20.680053
Last Analysis
2026-01-29 10:11:10.829436
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2026-01-05 14:00:29 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-01-29 13:59:35 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 23 days, 23 hours, 59 minutes
2026-01-29 15:21:24 UTC Report generation time 24 days, 1 hours, 20 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +57 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 57 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • ALYac
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • F-Secure
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • TACHYON
  • Xcitium
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (47.92% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 25221 47.92%
System 14834 28.19%
Registry 6339 12.04%
Process 3729 7.09%
Misc 1481 2.81%
Com 303 0.58%
Device 263 0.50%
Services 177 0.34%
Threading 175 0.33%
Crypto 35 0.07%
Synchronization 35 0.07%
Hooking 18 0.03%
Windows 11 0.02%
Network 8 0.02%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1053.002 – schedule task via at
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1543.003 – delete service
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1543.003 – stop service
  • T1489 – stop service
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1007 – query service status
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
  • T1016 – Reads network adapter information
  • T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
  • T1057 – Enumerates running processes
  • T1134 – Enables process privileges
  • T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
  • T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
  • T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
  • T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
  • T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
  • T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
  • T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
  • T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
  • T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
  • T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
  • T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1053.002 – schedule task via at
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1007 – query service status
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1543.003 – delete service
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
  • T1082 – Queries for the computername
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1543.003 – stop service
  • T1489 – stop service
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.
www.msftncsi.com 23.219.36.108 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 56 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.349102973937988 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 7.2728590965271 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 7.281605005264282 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 7.891366004943848 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 7.288664102554321 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 10.052580118179321 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 7.286448001861572 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 50586 53 348.6301200389862 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51628 53 116.94262599945068 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51663 53 178.9583661556244 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 10.692504167556763 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51880 53 211.5672149658203 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 10.10057806968689 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 52464 53 319.8661861419678 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 53480 53 244.17660307884216 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 54684 53 291.1453731060028 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 54823 53 511.598592042923 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 55183 53 362.98971915245056 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56007 53 525.957967042923 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 40.50471806526184 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56473 53 102.53653407096863 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56666 53 225.92686104774475 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58090 53 272.8959000110626 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58800 53 334.2709081172943 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58917 53 84.19211101531982 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 59770 53 55.14640808105469 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60054 53 258.5357840061188 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60334 53 131.37967705726624 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 61467 53 497.2392041683197 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 61507 53 149.95783019065857 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62120 53 164.44282507896423 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62329 53 69.72441506385803 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 26.11490797996521 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63550 53 197.20804905891418 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 64563 53 305.5053360462189 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 50586 53 347.6324350833893 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51628 53 115.94597005844116 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51663 53 177.96591997146606 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 11.692541122436523 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51880 53 210.56763696670532 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 11.09872317314148 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 52464 53 318.8647711277008 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 53480 53 243.17761516571045 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 54684 53 290.14599609375 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 54823 53 510.5993790626526 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 55183 53 361.98970198631287 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56007 53 524.9601101875305 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 39.505500078201294 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56473 53 101.54145097732544 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56666 53 224.9270420074463 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58090 53 271.89565205574036 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58800 53 333.2757360935211 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58917 53 83.20433115959167 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 59770 53 54.15546798706055 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60054 53 257.53680896759033 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60334 53 130.39504098892212 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 61467 53 496.24064803123474 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 61507 53 148.96410512924194 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62120 53 163.44456505775452 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62329 53 68.72469711303711 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 25.116432189941406 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63550 53 196.20841908454895 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 64563 53 304.50546312332153 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

0

Services Started

1

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Service
SNMPTRAP

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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