Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 49. Missed: 24. Coverage: 67.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (38.70% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Terminates another process
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Resolves a suspicious Top Level Domain (TLD)
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – Executed a command line with /C or /R argument to terminate command shell on completion which can be used to hide execution
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1198 – The binary has an Authenticode signature
• T1198 – The file have a Trusted Certificate
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1116 – The binary has an invalid Authenticode signature.
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.