Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 429+ days, this malware remained undetected — an extremely prolonged compromise that provided the adversary extensive opportunity for advanced persistent operations, comprehensive data harvesting, lateral movement across network segments, and sophisticated evasion technique deployment.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 70. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 17. Coverage: 75.7%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1027 – encrypt data using DES
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1129 – get kernel32 base address
• T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encode data using ADD XOR SUB operations
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1082 – check OS version
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1564 – Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection.
• T1202 – Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters.
• T1564.004 – Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection.
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1074 – Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration.
• T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
• T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
• T1569.002 – Uses sc.exe to modify the status of services
• T1543.003 – Uses sc.exe to modify the status of services
• T1547.001 – Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Drops PE files to the startup folder (C:\\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Stores files to the Windows startup directory
• T1036 – Creates files inside the program directory
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1036 – Creates a directory in C:\Program Files
• T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
• T1564.001 – Creates files in the recycle bin to hide itself
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1010 – Sample monitors Window changes (e.g. starting applications), analyze the sample with the simulation cookbook
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.