Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 61. Missed: 12. Coverage: 83.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (79.49% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – check OS version
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – get file size
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1573 – Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol.
• T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
• T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
• T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
• T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1047 – Collects BIOS properties
• T1047 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1047 – Collects hardware properties
• T1047 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
• T1055.012 – Process Hollowing
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Collects BIOS properties
• T1082 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1082 – Collects hardware properties
• T1115 – Captures clipboard data
• T1518.001 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1055 – Writes to foreign memory regions
• T1055 – Allocates memory in foreign processes
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027.002 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
• T1027 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS for network communication, use the SSL MITM Proxy cookbook for further analysis
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
• T1095 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Performs DNS lookups
• T1071 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS
• T1105 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.